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February 2003
Honorable Court:
Attorneys Rebecca Smith of the National Employment Law Project,
Professor Sarah Cleveland, Amanda Levinson and Emily Rickers of the
University of Texas School of Law, Professor Beth Lyon of Villanova
University School of Law,1 Ana Avendaño of the National Immigration
Law Center and D. Michael Dale of the Northwest Worker Justice Center
present this brief amicus curiae on behalf of fifty labor, civil rights and
immigrants’ rights organizations in the United States, listed in Appendix A,
in the matter of the Request for Advisory Opinion submitted by the
Government of the United Mexican States to the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights regarding the human rights of migrant workers, OC-18.

INTRODUCTION
Immigrant workers in the United States of America are among the most
poorly paid and poorly treated in the workforce. Amici’s attempts to protect
the rights of immigrants, including unauthorized2 workers, have been
severely hampered by domestic U.S. laws that discriminate on the basis of
alienage and immigration status, and especially by a recent decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
Immigrant workers in particular employment-related visa categories are
explicitly excluded from the protections of certain U.S. labor and
employment laws. So, too, immigrant workers who lack employment
authorization required by federal law (“unauthorized immigrants”) are
denied the protection of some state and federal laws. As a result of the
Hoffman decision, many employers have defended pending cases by
claiming that unauthorized immigrant workers have no labor and
employment rights in the United States. Undoubtedly, some lower courts
will find that unauthorized immigrants are excluded from the protections of
additional labor laws.
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In the U.S., employer threats to retaliate against complaining workers by
calling in the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service to arrest them
are common. These threats are on the rise in the last several months, and
have had several pernicious effects: First, they have a severe chilling effect
on workers’ ability to enforce their remaining rights. Second, employers
who would first hire, then abuse, and finally retaliate against unauthorized
employees gain a competitive advantage over those who follow the law.
Since these employers suffer no penalty for violating the law, they are
encouraged to hire the undocumented, and the goals of U.S. immigration
laws are thus thwarted.
Amici are concerned that continued employer threats of retaliation and
actual retaliation mean that, regardless of the outcome of pending legal
cases, many immigrant workers will be too intimidated to bring their
legitimate complaints to the authorities. Because of this chilling effect, and
because of legal restrictions on access to federal legal services for
undocumented immigrants, the result will be more severe exploitation of a
highly vulnerable workforce, all to the detriment of workers, law-abiding
employers, and domestic immigration policy.
The OAS Charter proclaims that “work gives dignity to the one who
performs it.”3 Discriminatory U.S. laws deprive millions of migrant
workers of that dignity simply because they have been forced to cross
international borders in order to survive. In the name of immigration
control, U.S. federal and state employment laws violate international human
rights law binding on this country.
Amici recognize that states retain the authority under international law to
decide whether to admit aliens. For the purposes of this case, amici do not
dispute that a state may have the right to deny employment to aliens
altogether under certain circumstances, in order to further its border control
policy. However, once an alien is present in a state’s territory and actually
working, international law, including the instruments of the OAS system,
prohibits discrimination on the basis of alienage or immigration status in
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workplace benefits and protects the right to freedom of association for all
workers. U.S. employment laws that discriminate against migrant workers
on the basis of alienage or immigration classification accordingly violate
these norms.
This amicus submission considers only those human rights sources that
are binding in some form on the United States. Amici curiae understand
that this Court has no jurisdiction over the United States and do not make
the following argument in order to seek any binding legal pronouncements
on our government’s actions. We feel it is important, however, to
demonstrate that the United States’ practice subjects the massive migrant
worker population in this country to human rights deprivations of the most
serious kind. We hope thus to demonstrate to this Honorable Court the
urgent necessity for strong regional standards regarding the protection of
migrant workers.
The importance of this question for millions of OAS nationals who
migrate for employment, and the lack of jurisprudence from other
international bodies regarding the employment rights of migrant workers,
create an important opportunity for this Court to clarify the obligations of
the Inter-American system and to provide fundamental human rights
protection to this uniquely vulnerable group.

ARGUMENT
I. U.S. Laws Deny Basic Employment Protections to Foreign Workers on
the Basis of Alienage or Immigration Status.
A. The Unauthorized Population Performs a Large Part of the LowWage, High Risk Employment in the United States.
North America absorbs the highest number of international migrants in
the world.4 The United States is the top migrant-receiving nation, and has
the largest international migrant population worldwide.5 A subgroup of the
migrant population is undocumented. The number of undocumented
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immigrants in the United States is estimated at roughly double the entire
undocumented population of Europe.6 In some industries, these numbers
are extremely high. For example, eighty-one percent of U.S. farm workers
are foreign-born, mainly from Mexico.7 At least half of the agricultural
workforce is not authorized to work in the United States.8
Various sources provide estimates of the undocumented population in the
U.S. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) keeps a
periodically updated estimate of undocumented residents. The latest INS
statistic estimates five million undocumented immigrants as of 1996.9 More
recent private estimates profit from the 2000 Census process, which
invested resources in encouraging greater participation by undocumented
immigrants.10 The Pew Hispanic Center, a non-partisan research
organization,11 estimates the total illegal-resident population in the United
States at 7.8 million.12 The Migration Policy Institute tentatively places the
2000 undocumented population at 8.5 million.13
The Pew Hispanic Center estimates the numbers of undocumented
immigrants in the workforce, placing the unauthorized urban labor force at
5.3 million14 and the unauthorized agricultural labor force at 1.2 million.15
The Center notes that there is significant overlap between the urban and
agricultural work force and because of the uncertainty about how to
calculate the overlap, the authors decline to provide an estimate of the total
unauthorized workforce.16 For the purposes of this brief, using the urban
labor force figure of 5.3 million as a rough estimate of the total number of
undocumented workers in the United States is sufficient to establish the
population as a serious economic factor and compelling focus of political
and human concern.
About 4.7 million of the U.S. undocumented population, or 55%, come
from Mexico. About 1.9 million come from other nations in Latin America,
and 1.1 million come from Asia. A few hundred thousand undocumented
immigrants come from Europe, Canada, and Africa.17
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Undocumented workers in the United States work in a variety of low
wage, high-risk occupations. The manufacturing sector employs 1.2 million
undocumented workers.
The services sector employs 1.3 million
undocumented workers. One million to 1.4 million unauthorized workers
labor in the fields. Six hundred thousand more work in construction and
700,000 work in restaurants.18
In 1996 and 1997, INS inspections found that 23% of workers at
Nebraska and Iowa meatpacking plants had questionable documents. An
INS inspection of eighty-nine construction businesses in Las Vegas found
that 39% of workers appeared to be unauthorized to work. Inspections of
seventy-four Los Angeles-area garment contractors found 41% of the
employees were unauthorized to work.19 In recent years, the number of
unauthorized immigrant workers in the poultry industry has increased,
prompting the INS to deem the employment of unauthorized workers a
major problem.20
Many of these same industries are known for low wages, dangerous
conditions, and frequent violations of labor laws. A U.S. Department of
Labor (DOL) survey found that in 2000, 100% of all poultry processing
plants were non-compliant with federal wage and hour laws.21 A separate
DOL survey found that in 1996, half of all garment-manufacturing
businesses in New York City could be characterized as sweatshops, and a
DOL survey in agriculture focused on cucumbers, lettuce, and onions
revealed that compliance in these commodities was unacceptably low.22
Injuries and deaths of Latino workers engaged in hazardous employment
are extremely high and increasing. In the year 2000, construction fatalities
involving Latino workers increased by 24%, while Latino employment was
up only six percent.23 New York has the nation’s highest rate of immigrants
killed in the workplace, with foreign-born workers accounting for three out
of every 10 deaths.24
In 2001, farm workers employed in the production of crops accounted for
only one percent of the workforce, but represented six percent of the
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occupational deaths.25 In that year, there were forty-nine farm fatalities in
the state of California alone.26
Thus, it is no secret that many U.S. employers are hiring unauthorized
workers and profiting from their labor. Both because of overt exclusions
from the protection of domestic labor laws, and because of the practical and
legal effects of the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Hoffman, the task of enforcing workers’ rights has become increasingly
more difficult. The Hoffman decision has contributed to a general climate
of fear among immigrant workers in the United States and a general
reluctance, and often, inability, to enforce existing rights. The following
sections will examine that climate, employers’ willingness to hire the
unauthorized, and the limitations of U.S. labor law that exacerbate the
victimization of these workers.
B. Case Examples: Unscrupulous Employers Use Extra-Judicial
Threats to Suppress Exercise of Labor Rights.
The practice of threatening to expose, and exposing, workers to the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service in order to suppress immigrant
workers’ exercise of their labor rights has been a common one in the United
States for many years. For example:
Victor Benavides began working as a boiler mechanic in 1990. Before he
was hired, the president of the corporation personally interviewed Mr.
Benavides. Mr. Benavides told the president that he was working
unlawfully in the United States. The president responded that he only
needed a “legal” name so that Benavides could be listed on the company’s
books. Several months later, when Benavides and another undocumented
worker, Alberto Guzman, became active in a union organizing drive, and in
an atmosphere of “flagrant and pervasive unfair labor practices,” the
workers were fired. One day after the union won the election, the employer
asked the INS to investigate the legal status of its employees.27
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In 1999, workers at a Holiday Inn Express hotel in Minneapolis voted to
join the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees union. A call to the
INS by the employer resulted in the arrest of eight members of the union’s
negotiating committee.28
In 1996, the Teamsters’ and United Farm Workers’ unions began a joint
organizing drive in Washington State’s lucrative apple industry, beginning
with a packing company in Wenatchee, Washington. One employee, Mary
Mendez, quotes the employer’s anti-union consultant as having told the
workers: “there hasn’t been a union here yet, and the INS hasn’t done any
raids. But with a union, the INS is going to be around.” The union lost the
subsequent election.29
Silvia Contreras worked as a secretary for a company that sells
commercial insurance to truck drivers. In 1997, after Ms. Contreras filed a
claim for unpaid wages and overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
her employer turned her in to the INS.30
In U.S. v. Alzanki,31 an employer confined her immigrant employee to the
apartment, forced her to work fifteen hour days, exposed her to noxious
cleaning chemicals, and refused to provide medical treatment when the
chemicals caused her illness. The employer threatened her with deportation
almost daily. He was later convicted of holding her in involuntary
servitude.
In Gilbert, Arizona, female employees at Quality Art LLC, a picture
frame manufacturing company, accused their employer of offensive and
intrusive searches, as well as other harassment on the basis of sex, such as
being assigned to sex-segregated positions. The employer retaliated by
terminating some employees, forcing some workers to quit their jobs based
on the hostile work environment, and reported the women to the INS.
Although INS officials said that they sympathized with the women—calling
them “courageous” for coming forward—INS indicated that the women
likely would be returned to their countries.32
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Since the United States Supreme Court decision in Hoffman,
unscrupulous employers’ threats of retaliation have continued unabated.
Immediately after the Court’s ruling, an employer’s attorney in New York
cited Hoffman when he issued a written threat of litigation against a
community group that had announced the intention to protest unpaid wages.
The attorney stated, falsely, that Hoffman had outlawed a demonstration by
the group.33
Four Peruvian farm workers filed a claim against their former employers
for minimum wage and overtime violations, discrimination, and for housing
them in substandard housing over a four-year period from 1997 through
2001. After their lawsuit was filed, the defendant’s father contacted the
INS, and repeatedly pressured the agency to take enforcement action against
the plaintiffs, claiming that the unpaid workers are both undocumented and
“terrorists.” When Hoffman was decided, the employer used it to argue—
incorrectly—that the workers were not protected by U.S. labor and
employment law.34
Alejandro Vazquez and David Sanchez both worked for a Michigan
company as laborers. Both were seriously injured in separate accidents at
the workplace, suffering, respectively, a joint separation and a hand injury
requiring several surgeries. After the injuries, the employer received a letter
indicating that the two did not have social security numbers, and questioned
them about this fact in the workers’ compensation proceedings. The
employer fired both injured workers, and opposed the workers’
compensation claim on the basis that they were undocumented workers
from Mexico. Their claims are pending in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
The court has just determined that wage loss benefits are unavailable to
undocumented injured workers in Michigan because they have committed a
“crime” under state law by working illegally.35
Twenty-two Mexican workers were recruited from California to work as
carpenters on a power project in Texas. This past summer, a local
newspaper reported that after two weeks of work, the workers were told that
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they would not be paid, and that they must leave or the contractor would
call the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. The workers were
owed for two weeks of work at $12 to $16 per hour.36 Other examples are
noted in the report, Used and Abused, compiled by the Mexican American
Legal Defense and Education Fund and the National Employment Law
Project, attached as Appendix B.
C. The Employer Sanctions Scheme in the U.S. Poses No Deterrent to
Employer Threats.
1.

Basics of the employer sanctions law.

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) contains an
“employer sanctions” scheme that prohibits the employment of
unauthorized aliens in the United States.37 IRCA established an
“employment verification system” designed to deny employment to aliens
who are not lawfully present in the United States, or who are not lawfully
authorized to work in the United States. IRCA mandates that employers
verify the identity and eligibility of all new hires by examining specified
documents before they begin work.
Under the IRCA, if an immigrant job applicant is unable to present the
required documentation, she cannot legally be hired.38 If an employer
unknowingly hires an unauthorized alien, or if the alien becomes
unauthorized while employed, the employer is compelled to discharge the
worker upon discovery of the worker’s unauthorized status. Employers
who violate the law may be liable for civil fines and may be subject to
criminal prosecution.
IRCA also makes it a crime for an unauthorized alien to present
fraudulent documents to his or her employer.39 Unauthorized immigrants
who use or attempt to use fraudulent documents to subvert the employer
verification system established by IRCA are subject to fines and criminal
prosecution.40
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2. Employer sanctions are not an effective deterrent to hiring
unauthorized workers.
As noted above, employer hiring of unauthorized immigrants continues
unabated after IRCA. Employers have little reason to fear that INS will
sanction them for hiring unauthorized immigrants, and can easily come to
see hiring of the unauthorized as a legitimate cost-saving decision. This is
because the employer sanction system is full of holes and left largely
ignored by federal agencies.
The language of the verification requirements provides employers with a
“gaping loophole” that they exploit by hiring immigrants whom they know
have presented fraudulent documents.41 Under IRCA, employers are only
required to accept documents that appear on their face to be genuine and to
relate to the individual named.42 This has meant that an employer can
ignore documents it suspects are invalid, allow the worker to use documents
that belong to another person, or even take part in procuring documents for
the worker. “In effect, employers who are willing to comply just enough to
avoid appearing to disregard the law totally, but who in fact continue to rely
on unauthorized labor, are insulated from the law’s sanctions provisions.”43
Even where employers fail utterly to comply with the law, average
employer sanctions fines are low and rarely assessed. In fiscal year 1999,
the INS apprehended 1,714,035 aliens. Of this number, the Border Patrol
made 1,579,010 apprehensions, of which 97% were made along the
southwest border.44 By contrast, the number of warnings to employers
nationwide was 383, down 40% from 1998. The INS issued only 417
notices of intent to fine employers nationwide in 1999, a decrease of 59%.45
In the year 2000, warnings to employers decreased another 26%, and
notices of intent to fine decreased yet again, by 57%.46
According to the Immigration and Naturalization Service itself, “Neither
Republicans nor Democrats nor a broad range of interest groups is prepared
to support an employer sanction program that actually would work.”47
Thus, under the current legal scheme in the United States, employers may
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readily hire unauthorized workers, take advantage of them, and then
threaten to turn them in to the INS, all without fear of governmental action.
3. Employers continue to hire unauthorized workers after IRCA
because it is profitable.
Unauthorized immigrants commonly will decline to report private or
official abuse and are frequently unwilling to pursue civil claims in court.48
The lack of access to safety-net programs such as unemployment insurance,
food stamps, and welfare, supply further reasons for unauthorized workers
to suffer workplace illegality without risking job separation.49
In Dallas, Texas, the Regional Administrator of the Wage and Hour
Division of the U.S. Department of Labor indicates that illegal immigrant
workers endure sexual harassment, denial of overtime pay, and wages
below the minimum federal standard because they are worried they will be
deported.50
When unauthorized workers are not protected by labor laws,
unscrupulous employers are encouraged to hire them. This, in turn,
undermines the effectiveness of a country’s immigration laws. When it
considered the IRCA for passage, the United States Congress understood
this dynamic. In their consideration of IRCA, both houses of Congress
agreed that employers easily abuse undocumented workers. Each house
concluded that undocumented immigrants, “out of desperation, will work in
substandard conditions and for starvation wages.”51 For that reason,
Congress stated that, after IRCA, labor laws should continue to protect the
undocumented.52 Unfortunately, enforcement has not occurred. As
discussed in the next section, unauthorized workers and other immigrant
workers remain unprotected by many U.S. employment laws, both by the
Hoffman and other court decisions, and by express exclusions in state and
federal law.
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D. Court Decisions Deprive Certain Immigrants of Meaningful
Remedies for Violation of their Rights.
Immigrant workers in particular immigration categories, especially
unauthorized immigrants, are expressly excluded from the remedies
available to their U.S. citizen counterparts. Here we outline the Hoffman
decision and its effect on remedies available to unauthorized workers under
U.S. law.
1. Collective bargaining laws – Unauthorized workers not entitled to
meaningful remedies for violation of their rights.
The primary law under which workers are guaranteed the right to
organize trade unions and bargain collectively in the United States is the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).53 Although unauthorized workers
are considered “employees” under the NLRA,54 under current law, workers
in irregular migratory status are not afforded the same remedies for
violation of this right as are other workers. In its March 2002 decision in
Hoffman,55 the Supreme Court held that an unauthorized worker cannot
recover the remedy of back pay for an unlawful termination under the
National Labor Relations Act.
The limitation on remedies afforded to unauthorized workers means that
many workers will not exercise their rights to organize. The limitation on
remedies has also spilled over into other areas of law. As noted in Section
B, above, and the attached Report in Appendix B, some employers in the
U.S. are attempting to use the Hoffman decision to limit undocumented
workers’ rights in many areas.
The Hoffman case involved a worker named José Castro. Mr. Castro was
working in a factory in California and was fired, along with other coworkers, for his organizing activities. The National Labor Relations Board,
the agency that administers the NLRA, ordered the employer to cease and
desist, to post a notice that it had violated the law and to reinstate Mr.
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Castro, and to provide him with back pay for the time he was not working
because he had been illegally fired.
During a hearing on his case, Mr. Castro admitted he had used false
documents to establish work authorization and that he was an unauthorized
worker. The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately held that unauthorized workers
cannot receive back pay under the National Labor Relations Act. Under the
Act, back pay is paid to a victim of an illegal anti-union firing in order to
compensate him for wages he would have earned had he not been
wrongfully fired.
In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court focused on the fact that the
“legal landscape [had] now significantly changed”56 since Congress had
enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, and its employer
sanctions provisions. According to the Court, IRCA’s prohibition on
employer hiring of unauthorized workers, and on workers’ acceptance of
employment without work authorization requires the National Labor
Relations Board to deny back pay to these workers, because back pay would
compensate these workers for work they cannot lawfully perform.
Neither the U.S. Constitution, nor any provision of IRCA or the NLRA
prohibits back pay awards to unauthorized workers. However, the Court
refused to defer to the NLRA’s enforcement scheme because it reasoned
that to do so would “trump” Congressional immigration policy. It is
important to note that the U.S. government pursued Castro’s case and
defended the position that he was entitled to back pay before the U.S.
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court did not have before it any arguments based on
international law; nor were international legal precepts taken into
consideration in its decision. Nor did the Court, which decided the case by
the slimmest of margins—five justices supporting the decision and four
opposing—take into account the practical impact of its decision on the labor
rights of international migrant workers.
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Since the Hoffman decision, the National Labor Relations Board has
stated that unauthorized workers will not be entitled to back pay, or to
reinstatement when they are illegally fired, unless they can show that they
now have lawful employment status.57 The Board’s policy does not
distinguish between employers who knowingly hire workers who are
unauthorized, in violation of U.S. law, and those who do not know of the
worker’s illegal status at the time of hire.
Back pay is the only meaningful remedy available to workers under the
NLRA. After Hoffman, the only remedies available to unauthorized
immigrants in the U.S. are these: an employer who illegally fires an
unauthorized worker might be ordered to post a notice about the violations
of the law, and might be told to “cease and desist” violating the law. In
certain cases, an employer who violates the law again might be subject to
penalties for contempt of court. Back pay is the only monetary
compensation afforded under the National Labor Relations Act to victims of
employer wrongdoing. After the Court’s decision, this remedy is
unavailable to unauthorized workers, with the result that workers will be
much less likely to exercise their remaining rights, unscrupulous employers
will have no reason to respect those rights, and law-abiding employers will
be tempted to violate the law or face a competitive disadvantage.
2. Discrimination laws—Unauthorized workers not entitled to equal
remedies with authorized workers.
The Hoffman decision also has important implications for the remedies
available to unauthorized workers under the U.S. anti-discrimination laws.
In the United States, Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act protects
workers’ rights to be free from discrimination based on several factors: sex,
color, race, religion, and national origin.58 The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act protects workers’ rights to be free from discrimination
based on age.59 The Americans with Disabilities Act protects workers’
rights to be free from discrimination based on disabilities.60
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Unauthorized workers may not be entitled to back pay for wrongful
termination under laws enforced by the EEOC.
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the
government agency that enforces most federal employment discrimination
laws. After the Hoffman decision, the EEOC rescinded its Enforcement
Guidance on Remedies Available to Undocumented Workers.61 It noted that
since its former practice of awarding back pay to undocumented workers
was based on the NLRA, it was reviewing that practice in light of Hoffman.
The EEOC’s statement leaves in doubt whether undocumented workers will
be entitled to back pay under Title VII.
Recently, a federal court in New York issued a troubling decision in a
case involving violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, suggesting
that Hoffman has made the issue of immigration status relevant to a
worker’s standing to sue for relief under the anti-discrimination laws, and
which may well serve as an indicator of things to come.
In denying a
defendant’s motion to dismiss in Lopez v. Superflex, Ltd.,62 the judge noted:
If Hoffman Plastic does deny undocumented workers the relief
sought by plaintiff, then he would lack standing. As that issue is
not ripe for decision, we decline to rule on it at this time.
However, if plaintiff were to admit to being in the United States
illegally, or were to refuse to answer questions regarding his status
on the grounds that it is not relevant, then the issue of his standing
would properly be before us, and we would address the issue of
whether Hoffman Plastic applies to ADA claims for compensatory
and punitive damages brought by undocumented aliens.63
Like denial of the back pay remedy under the National Labor Relations
Act, denial of back pay to unauthorized immigrant victims of discrimination
means that one of the most effective deterrents to further violations is no
longer available. It remains to be seen whether certain courts may limit
unauthorized immigrant workers’ rights to receive other forms of monetary
compensation for discrimination.
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Unauthorized workers not protected at all against age discrimination in five
states.
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman, most courts in the
country agreed that unauthorized immigrants were entitled to the protection
of age discrimination laws. In one case, however, prior to Hoffman, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, covering the states of Maryland, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia, had held that an
individual without work authorization was not “qualified” for the job, and
therefore not protected by the federal law against age discrimination in
employment.64
Foreign nationals under H-2A visa program excluded from protection of
law in five states.
The same court has also held that the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act did not protect a foreign nationals applying for a job from outside the
United States under the H-2A visa program because he was not authorized
to work at the time of his job application, and therefore not qualified for the
job.65
3. Minimum wage and overtime violations—workers’ rights to back pay
for retaliatory firings not clear.
In the United States, the federal Fair Labor Standards Act guarantees a
minimum wage, currently $5.15 per hour, and a right to overtime pay for
hours worked over forty in a week for covered workers.66 The law is
explicitly intended to protect the wages of low-income workers, and to
protect law-abiding employers from the unfair competition that results from
unscrupulous employers’ payment of unfairly low wages.67
Prior to Hoffman, the Eleventh Circuit had held that an unauthorized
worker was eligible for unpaid wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act in
Patel v. Quality Inn South.68 The court concluded that, “the Fair Labor
Standards Act’s coverage of unauthorized aliens is fully consistent with the
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IRCA and the policies behind it.”69 Moreover, the court concluded that the
plaintiff was eligible for back pay on the basis that the plaintiff was “not
attempting to recover back pay for being unlawfully deprived of a job.
Rather, he simply seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime for
work already performed.”70
Hoffman leaves intact the right to minimum wage and overtime pay under
the FLSA since Hoffman deals only with back pay for work not performed.
The U.S. Department of Labor, the federal agency charged with enforcing
the Fair Labor Standards Act, has stated that the Department “will fully and
vigorously enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act without regard to whether
an employee is documented or undocumented.”71 However, the Department
has not made clear its view on unauthorized immigrants’ entitlement to
back pay for retaliatory discharges, saying that it is “still considering”
Hoffman’s effect on this remedy.72
E. U.S. Laws Explicitly Exempt Certain Immigrants from Workplace
Protections.
As noted above, the Hoffman decision has resulted in a diminution of the
remedies available to unauthorized workers under U.S. laws protecting the
right to organize and protecting workers from discrimination in
employment. In addition, even prior to Hoffman, some U.S. laws have
expressly discriminated against workers in certain immigration categories,
including both unauthorized workers and other workers in particular visa
categories. This section outlines those laws.
1. Workers’ rights to be compensated for on the job injuries limited in
some states.
Workers’ compensation is a state system that provides remuneration for
employees who have been injured while working on the job. In general, it
covers the medical costs of an injured employee, and allows a worker to
continue to be partially paid during the period he or she is unable to work.
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Workers’ compensation laws also provide compensation for disabilities and
for the family of an employee who dies on the job. In the United States,
workers give up their right to sue an employer for unhealthy conditions on
the job that cause them injuries. In return, workers receive certain benefits
for any on the job injury through the workers’ compensation system,
whether or not the employer causes the injury. Though workers’
compensation is generally an issue of state law, and the state laws vary,
generally workers receive medical payments, partial replacement of wages,
pensions, death benefits, and sometimes retraining for new jobs.
In most states, unauthorized workers are covered under the law.
The majority of the States’ workers’ compensation laws include “aliens”
in the definition of covered employees.73 Entitlement to lost wages under
state workers’ compensation laws turns on state statutes and their definition
of “worker” or “employee.” State courts in California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Texas have specifically held that unauthorized
workers are covered under their state workers’ compensation laws.74
However, at least one state, Wyoming, explicitly denies workers’
compensation benefits to unauthorized immigrants.75
At least two states deny certain rehabilitation benefits to unauthorized
workers.
Vocational rehabilitation benefits are normally provided for workers who
have been injured on the job as part of the overall workers’ compensation
benefits package. Vocational rehabilitation is granted so that an injured
employee may be retrained to perform the same job, or to perform a
different job at the same company. Courts in the states of Nevada and
California have concluded that unauthorized workers are not entitled to
vocational rehabilitation benefits under certain circumstances.76
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Death benefits for non-residents limited in some states.
Workers’ compensation laws in many states bar the non-resident family
members of workers killed on the job from receiving full benefits. In those
states, whenever the family member is living outside the United States and
is not a United States citizen, the family members do not receive the full
death benefits award. There are several ways in which states limit
compensation to nonresident alien beneficiaries. Some states limit
compensation compared to the benefits a lawful resident would have
received, generally 50% (Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa,
Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina).77 Some states restrict the
types of non-resident dependents who are eligible to receive benefits as
beneficiaries (Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Pennsylvania).
Other states limit coverage based on: the length of time a migrant has been
a citizen (Wisconsin), the laws of the alien resident beneficiary’s home
country (Washington), or the cost of living in the alien resident
beneficiary’s home country (Oregon).78 Alabama denies benefits to all
foreign beneficiaries.79 Although these laws do not explicity discriminate
on the basis of alienage alone, they disproportionately deny equal benefits
to non-nationals, who are most likely to have beneficiaries who are nonresident aliens.
New rulings may endanger unauthorized workers’ entitlement to wage loss
compensation.
Since the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Hoffman, employers in two states
have challenged unauthorized workers’ entitlement to workers’
compensation coverage, or to elements of that coverage. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has held that, while an injured unauthorized worker
is entitled to medical benefits, illegal immigration status would justify
terminating benefits for temporary total disability (wage loss) benefits.80
Very recently, the Michigan Court of Appeals decided that wage loss
benefits may be cut off to undocumented workers as of the date that the
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employer “discovers” that the worker is unauthorized. Cases like these
encourage unscrupulous employers to suddenly “discover” a workers’
unauthorized status as soon as he or she suffers an on the job injury, thereby
lowering the employer’s workers’ compensation premiums.81
2.

H-2A workers denied many employment protections.

Approximately 40,000 workers who are admitted to the United States
annually as temporary non-immigrant workers to perform agricultural work
under the H-2A program, most of whom are from Mexico, are denied many
basic federal employment protections.82 H-2A workers are excluded from
the protections of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection
Act (MSAWPA), which is the principal federal employment law for
agricultural workers.83 This exclusion has many serious effects. H-2A
migrant workers, unlike other farm workers, are not entitled to disclosures
about the job terms at the time they are recruited.84 Indeed, the recruiter
need not even tell the worker for whom he will be working for in the United
States. The labor contractors used to recruit and hire H-2A workers need
not be registered and monitored by the U.S. Department of Labor. The
MSAWPA’s transportation safety standards and vehicle insurance
requirements for migrant workers are inapplicable to H-2A workers,85 and
H-2A workers are denied the full monetary remedies provided by the
MSAWPA as well as the ability to sue in federal court.86
H-2A workers’ permission to remain lawfully in the United States is tied
to only one employer. These workers therefore lack the freedom to leave
abusive employers and seek other employment in the United States.87 In
addition to the general exclusion of agricultural workers from the collective
bargaining protections of the NLRA, H-2A workers are denied rights to
freedom of association to demand higher wage rates or better working
conditions as a practical matter, because employers are legally permitted to
reject such demands and to fire and deport H-2A workers who make them.
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3.

Citizenship discrimination law excludes unauthorized immigrants.

Immigrants without work authorization are excluded from the protection
of the Unfair Immigration-Related Employment Practices Act, which
protects against discrimination based on citizenship and national origin in
employment.88 This Act was passed at the same time as the IRCA, and was
intended to protect immigrants from discrimination that might result from
the imposition of IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions.
4. Immigrant workers’ rights of access to legal representation
restricted.
In 1974, the U.S. Congress passed the Legal Services Corporation Act
(LSCA), which was designed to provide equal access to the civil justice
system for people who cannot afford lawyers.89 To this end, the LSCA
created the Legal Services Corporation, an independent corporation that
makes grants to legal aid programs.90 One of the key reasons that working
people need access to the civil justice system is to enforce their labor rights.
As a practical matter, without the means to bring suit in court, workers’
rights cannot be adequately enforced.91
Certain immigrants, including the unauthorized and H-2B workers, have no
right to legal assistance.
Legal Services Corporation programs are prohibited from providing legal
assistance “for or on behalf of” most immigrant workers who are not lawful
permanent residents.92 This ban on representation prohibits representing
unauthorized workers, as well as many categories of workers who are
legally admitted to work in the United States, such as workers admitted to
perform unskilled non-agricultural labor under the H-2B program. Legal
aid programs can be fined or have their funding taken away if they are
found to have provided services to unauthorized workers. Without the help
of legal services, low-wage immigrant workers cannot afford to hire an
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attorney to press their legal cases. Therefore, they are effectively prevented
from enforcing their remaining rights.
II. U.S. Employment Laws Concerning Migrant Workers Violate
Fundamental International Norms of Nondiscrimination and Freedom of
Association.
States historically have asserted the right to restrict the rights and
activities of foreign nationals based on either their non-citizen or
immigration status for a variety of reasons. International law recognizes the
right of states to control movement across their borders as a matter both of
sovereignty and of national security.93 States have exercised this right
through direct measures such as physical border controls, visa and entry
permits, and quotas that limit the number and nationality of people who
may enter the country. States also have sought to control immigration
through indirect measures, such as limits on access to employment or denial
of access to public benefits. States furthermore have denied aliens rights
that arguably are owed only to individuals who are citizens or official
members of the political community, such as the rights to vote, to hold
public office, to engage in certain political activities, and to hold certain
civil service jobs.94 States also have discriminated against non-nationals
for purely xenophobic reasons through restrictions on social and cultural
life, such as bans on inter-ethnic marriage or the teaching of foreign
languages.
Although international law recognizes the right of states to control their
borders, international law prohibits many forms of discrimination against
non-nationals, whether or not the individuals are legally present in the state.
No state, for example, can claim the right to commit genocide or torture
against non-nationals. As discussed below, non-nationals also are protected
by fundamental human rights in the workplace such as the prohibition
against discrimination and the protection of freedom of association.
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U.S. employment laws discriminate against migrant workers based on a
number of criteria, such as the worker’s possession of a valid work
authorization or a particular visa status, the presence of the worker’s alien
relatives outside the country, or the worker’s unlawful immigration status.
The denial of meaningful remedies for violations of freedom of association
under Hoffman, and the denial of workers’ compensation and vocational
rehabilitation benefits in some states, turn on whether an immigrant
(whether lawfully present in the country or not) possesses a legal work
authorization. The restrictions on the rights of H-2A workers are tied to the
particular visa status of such workers as lawful temporary non-immigrants.
Restrictions on death benefits to non-resident alien beneficiaries disparately
impact immigrant workers and their alien dependents. Further, migrants
who are not lawfully present in the United States are denied access to
federally-funded legal services representation in employment and other
claims.
Amici do not contest that states have a right under international law to
control their borders. Nor do they contend, for purposes of this brief, that
states cannot deny the right to employment to certain immigrants as part of
an immigration control policy. Amici contend instead that once an alien is
physically present in a country’s territory and secures employment, denial
of fundamental workplace protections to that immigrant worker violates
fundamental international human rights norms regarding nondiscrimination
and freedom of association. As discussed herein, international treaties that
are binding in some form on the United States make clear that fundamental
human rights protections, including nondiscrimination and freedom of
association, protect individuals in the workplace, regardless of the worker’s
nationality or immigration status.
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A. U.S. Employment Laws Violate the Prohibition Against
Discrimination
Numerous international instruments binding on the United States
likewise establish a universal norm of nondiscrimination that protects all
persons within a state’s jurisdiction. The U.N. Human Rights Committee
has established that most of the provisions of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) apply equally to aliens, including the
Article 2 and Article 26 prohibitions on discrimination, and that differences
in treatment based on alienage or nationality constitute discrimination when
they are not based on objective and reasonable criteria. The Committee’s
interpretation of this standard supports a finding that the differential
employment laws outlined above violate Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR. A
similar norm of nondiscrimination is recognized by the instruments of the
Inter-American system and supports the conclusion that U.S. laws denying
workplace protections on the basis of nationality or immigration status
violate Article II of the American Declaration. The International Labour
Organization (ILO) has concluded that the principle of nondiscrimination is
a fundamental human right which protects all individuals in the workplace,
regardless of their nationality or immigration status. And although some of
the substantive employment benefits addressed in this brief, such as
workers’ compensation, may not themselves be fundamental rights under
international law, discrimination in such benefits based on criteria that are
not objective and reasonable violates fundamental international human
rights law.
1.

Binding treaty provisions

The right to nondiscrimination is one of the most fundamental human
rights recognized by international law. Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N.
Charter pledge all member states to respect “human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion,”95
and recognize that such protection is “necessary for peaceful and friendly
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relations among nations.”96 The principle of nondiscrimination has been
further elaborated to prohibit discrimination based on nationality or other
status in the following treaty provisions that are applicable to the United
States:
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (ADHR or
American Declaration)97
Article II:
All persons are equal before the law and have the rights and duties
established in this Declaration without distinction as to race, sex, language,
creed or any other factor.
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR or American
Convention)98
Article 1:
1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights
and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to
their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and
freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, economic status, birth or any other social condition.
2. For the purposes of this Convention, “person” means every human
being.
Article 24:
All persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are entitled,
without discrimination, to equal protection of the law.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)99
Article 26:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
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effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR)100
Article 2(2):
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the
rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without
discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.101
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)102
Article 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.
Article 7
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to
such discrimination.
ILO Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Employment103
Article 1(1):
For the purpose of this Convention the term discrimination includes—(a)
any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour,
sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which
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has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment
in employment or occupation.
Article 2:
Each Member for which this Convention is in force undertakes to declare
and pursue a national policy designed to promote, by methods appropriate
to national conditions and practice, equality of opportunity and treatment in
respect of employment and occupation, with a view to eliminating any
discrimination in respect thereof.
The ILO has identified the prohibition against discrimination in
employment as one of four “core” worker rights that are internationally
recognized as fundamental human rights (the other core rights are freedom
of association, and the prohibition against forced and child labor),104 and
thus are binding on all ILO members.105
The plain language of the specific nondiscrimination provisions
discussed above suggests that these international instruments prohibit
employment discrimination on the basis of alienage. As discussed more
fully below, the language of the nondiscrimination provisions is
unambiguously universal. The equality provisions declare that “all
persons” or individuals are equal, not merely “all citizens” or even “all
persons lawfully present in a country.” The instruments also explicitly
prohibit discrimination based on national or social origin and other status.
Furthermore, the overall language and structure of the instruments listed
above supports the interpretation that aliens are entitled to the treaty’s
substantive work-related protections. Like the specific nondiscrimination
provisions, the instruments’ other substantive provisions are generally
applicable to all persons. Unlike the European Convention on Human
Rights and the Convention to Eliminate all Forms of Racial Discrimination,
the Inter-American instruments, the ICCPR, ICESCR, Universal
Declaration, and ILO Conventions do not provide for general exceptions
based on citizenship or immigration status.106 Moreover, the jurisprudence
of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American human rights
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bodies and the ILO support a finding that international law prohibits
denying workplace rights to aliens who are actually employed, regardless of
their immigration status, at least with respect to fundamental rights such as
nondiscrimination and freedom of association.
The language and
interpretation of the ICCPR, Inter-American instruments, ICESCR, and ILO
Convention No. 111 are each addressed in turn, below.
2. Aliens are protected by the ICCPR, and cannot be discriminated
against in either Covenant or non-Covenant rights absent reasonable and
objective criteria.
The plain language and negotiating history of the ICCPR and
interpretations of the U.N. Human Rights Committee establish that aliens
are entitled to the protections of the ICCPR, with a few limited exceptions,
and that the principle of non-discrimination under the ICCPR applies fully
to aliens. In other words, states cannot discriminate on the basis of
nationality or other status under the ICCPR unless the distinction is based
on reasonable and objective criteria.
Only three provisions of the ICCPR expressly distinguish between
citizens and aliens. Article 25, regarding “Political Rights,” recognizes
rights only for citizens to participate in government, to vote, and to public
service, while Article 13 prohibits the arbitrary expulsion of aliens. Articles
12 and 13 further permit States parties to deny a very narrow range of rights
to undocumented non-citizens, such as the freedom of movement and the
right to choose one’s residence (Art. 12), and the right to certain procedural
protections in expulsion proceedings (Art. 13), each of which applies only
to aliens “lawfully within the territory” of a State party.107 According to the
CCPR Commentary,108 the focus on lawful aliens in Article 12 reflects the
view that “aliens located on the territory of a State party have the same
claim as citizens to respect for and protection of the rights guaranteed by the
ICCPR…; [although] the decision on whether they are permitted to be in
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the territory of a State Party remains the sole matter of the State
concerned.”109
Other than these specific provisions that distinguish between citizens and
aliens or between legal and illegal aliens, the ICCPR expressly allows for
discrimination against non-citizens only “[i]n time of public emergency
which threatens the life of the nation” and then only “to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation,”110 circumstances which
certainly are not presented here. Under the principle of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, therefore, aliens are entitled to the other protections of the
ICCPR.
Moreover, although Articles 2 and 26 expressly secure ICCPR rights and
prohibit discrimination only on the basis of national origin and other status,
rather than expressly on nationality, the negotiating history indicates that
one of the primary purposes of Article 2 was to prohibit discrimination
against aliens in ICCPR rights.111 Negotiating states repeatedly noted that
Articles 2 and 26 should not prohibit all unequal treatment of aliens,112 but
the absence of any express provision in the ICCPR for distinctions based on
alienage (other than in Articles 12, 13, and 25), led several states to enter
reservations that would allow differential treatment of aliens in certain
circumstances.113
Consistent with the plain language of the ICCPR and its negotiating
history, the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) has ruled that
most state obligations under the treaty apply equally to non-nationals.114 In
its General Comment on the Position of Aliens, the Committee rejects the
suggestion that states are entitled to deny or limit aliens’ protections under
the Covenant. As stated by the Committee:
[E]ach State party must ensure the rights in the Covenant to ‘all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’. . . . In
general, the rights set forth in the Covenant apply to everyone,
irrespective of his nationality or statelessness. Thus, the general
rule is that each one of the rights of the Covenant must be
guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens.
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Aliens receive the benefit of the general requirement of nondiscrimination in respect of the rights guaranteed in the Covenant,
as provided for in article 2 thereof.115
The Committee’s General Comment notes that of the rights set forth in
the Covenant, only political rights such as the vote in Article 25 are limited
to citizens.116 The Committee specifically observed that aliens are entitled
to the Covenant’s protections regarding nondiscrimination and freedom of
association, among others.117
The General Comment recognizes that states have the right, in principle,
to decide whom to admit into their territory, and that states may condition
permission to enter by imposing some restrictions on movement, residence,
and employment.118 The Committee noted, however, that “in certain
circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant even in
relation to entry or residence, for example, when considerations of nondiscrimination, prohibition of inhuman treatment and respect for family life
arise.”119 The Comment further notes that once an alien is lawfully present
in a country, his or her freedom of movement can be restricted only under
the conditions set forth in Article 12(3) of the ICCPR120 and in a manner
with the other rights recognized by the ICCPR.121
Moreover, the Committee confirmed that entitlement to most of the
ICCPR’s protections is not limited to aliens who are legally present. The
General Comment noted that Article 13’s restriction to legal aliens was an
exception to the general principle that the ICCPR’s protections apply to all
persons in a State’s territory.122 And even here, the Committee observed
that “[d]iscrimination may not be made between different categories of
aliens in the application of article 13.”123
a.

U.S. employment restrictions violate ICCPR Articles 2 and 26

The prohibitions of discrimination under ICCPR Articles 2 and 26 are
both relevant to the question before this Court.
Article 2 bars
discrimination in the rights that are protected by the ICCPR (such as
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discrimination in freedom of association), while Article 26 prohibits
discrimination in substantive rights and benefits that are not, themselves,
mandated by the ICCPR.124
Under both Articles 2 and 26, whether a distinction based on alienage or
other criteria is prohibited turns on whether the distinction is based on
reasonable and objective criteria, and whether the distinction is
proportional in a given case.125 The prohibited bases for discrimination
listed in Articles 2 and 26 (distinctions on grounds of race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status) are not comprehensive, but represent
particularly reprehensible distinctions that are especially likely to be found
to be violations.126
In elaborating on these principles in the Broeks and Zwaan-de Vries
cases, involving gender discrimination under the Dutch Unemployment
Benefits Act, the Human Rights Committee reasoned that equal protection
of the law “prohibits discrimination in law or in practice in any field
regulated and protected by public authorities,” but that not all differences in
treatment are discriminatory, since “[a] differentiation based on reasonable
and objective criteria does not amount to prohibited discrimination within
the meaning of Art. 26.”127 The Committee nevertheless found that Article
26 had been violated, since the unemployment law discriminated on the
basis of sex—an unreasonable criterion.
Likewise, in Gueye v. France,128 the Committee applied this test to find
that a French employment law disadvantaging non-nationals violated
Article 26. The case was brought by a group of Senegalese nationals who
had served in the French military during the colonial era, and who were
provided lower pensions for their military service than French nationals.129
The Committee noted that Article 26 expressly prohibits discrimination
only on the basis of “national origin,” not on nationality per se, but
nevertheless concluded that the French law’s differentiation based on
citizenship constituted a distinction based on “other status” under Article
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26. The Committee also found that Article 26 had been violated, despite the
fact that the ICCPR does not expressly protect the right to a pension.130
The Committee concluded that France’s justifications for the
discrimination against non-nationals were not based on “reasonable and
objective criteria,” and thus were not permissible.131 The Committee
reasoned that the pension program’s purpose was to reward veterans for
their service to the government, and that the nationality of the recipient was
therefore irrelevant.132 The Committee stated that “[a] subsequent change
in nationality cannot by itself be considered as a sufficient justification for
different treatment, since the basis for the grant of the pension was the same
service which both they and the soldiers who remained French had
provided.”133
The Gueye analysis is directly relevant to U.S. employment laws limiting
protections for legal migrant workers, and it seems clear that many, if not
all, of these provisions violate Articles 2 and 26 under the Committee’s
reasoning. The Gueye case illustrates a number of points relevant to the
question before this Court.
First, it reaffirms the Human Rights
Committee’s position that provisions of the ICCPR (and, amici argue, of
human rights treaties generally), are applicable to non-nationals absent
express language to the contrary. Even though the ICCPR does not
expressly address discrimination based on nationality, the Gueye case
confirms that the treaty bars distinctions based on nationality or alienage,
like other distinctions, unless they are reasonable and objective.
Second, the Gueye case demonstrates that distinctions based on alienage
violate Article 26 even if the ICCPR does not expressly protect the
substantive benefit at issue (in this case, a right to pensions). In addition to
discrimination in freedom of association, an ICCPR right which cannot be
denied in a discriminatory manner under Article 2, the other employment
benefits at issue in this case are protected by many substantive treaty
provisions binding on this country, including the rights to fair remuneration,
proper working conditions, and effective recourse through legal aid. (For
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the relevant treaty provisions, see Appendix C, Tables 1-5). The Gueye
case stands for the proposition that discrimination in these benefits is
improper, absent a reasonable and objective basis, even if the substantive
rights themselves are not fundamental, or even recognized by the ICCPR.
In fact, the pension plan at issue in Gueye is closely analogous to the
various U.S. states’ death benefit schemes which discriminate against
decedents (the vast majority of whom are aliens) whose beneficiaries are
aliens not residing in the U.S. Although these death benefit schemes do not
facially discriminate on the basis of nationality, in contrast to the French
pension scheme in Gueye, like the French pension plan, their clear purpose
is to deny equal benefits to non-resident aliens in a manner which is not tied
to the actual cost of living in the particular locale where the beneficiary
resides. Under the Gueye analysis, discrimination in such benefits may be
impermissible even if the benefits themselves are not mandated by the
ICCPR.
Finally, the Gueye decision makes clear that in determining whether
discrimination in an employment benefit is reasonable and objective, and
therefore permissible, a court should examine the underlying purpose of the
employment law at issue to determine whether the distinction employed is
relevant to achieving that purpose. The U.S. laws workplace protections
that discriminate on the basis of alienage or immigration status fail under
this test. Employment benefits such as protection of freedom of association,
workers’ compensation, and access to legal services fundamentally serve
the purpose of protecting employees at work, and most effectively achieve
their purpose when applied and enforced equally with respect to all
workers. Once an alien is employed, that employee’s nationality, or even
his or her legal status, is irrelevant to the employment law’s goal of
protecting individuals in the workplace and preventing exploitation. Indeed,
allowing such laws to be applied differentially to non-citizen or
unauthorized workers will only undermine the rights of other workers,

VOLUME 1 • ISSUE 3 • 2003

833

834 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

promote labor exploitation, and adversely affect the laws’ underlying
protective goal.
The Gueye case did not directly address the issue of immigration control,
which is likely to be the primary governmental motive offered to justify
limiting worker protections for unauthorized workers. But immigration
control cannot be viewed as the primary purpose of employment protection
laws, and the United States’ restrictions on the employment protections of
aliens do not objectively and reasonably serve this purpose. Given the fact
that even employer sanctions laws have not curbed the entry of
undocumented persons into the United States, it seems fantastic to argue
that denying aliens fundamental rights to freedom of association, workers’
compensation, vocational training, death benefits or legal representation
could accomplish U.S. immigration goals. Furthermore, the justification of
immigration control does not plausibly apply to restrictions on the rights of
lawfully present and authorized workers in the United States, such as the
denial of freedom of association to H-2A workers.
In sum, amici recognize that states retain the authority under the ICCPR
to decide whether to admit aliens. For the purposes of this case, amici do
not dispute that a state may have the right to deny employment to aliens
altogether under certain circumstances, in order to further its border control
policy. However, once an alien is present in a state’s territory and actually
working, that alien is fully entitled to the ICCPR’s workplace protections,
and distinctions based on alienage are permissible only when based on
reasonable and objective criteria. Distinctions in employment protections
are legitimate only if nationality or immigration status is somehow
objectively and reasonably relevant to achieving the employment
protection’s goal. Applying this standard to the question before the Court
should lead this Court to conclude that differential application of
employment protections to aliens who are present and working in a state’s
territory cannot be justified. Every worker in America is contributing to our
society, and has need of protection in his or her role as a worker. Any
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employment situation is fraught with unique vulnerabilities. These
vulnerabilities, compounded in the case of a foreign worker, are an
inappropriate—and, as demonstrated above, ineffective—vehicle for
migration policy. Far from being a reasonable and objective path toward
migration control, differential labor protections for migrant workers merely
represent the receiving country’s ability to take advantage of workers whose
bargaining power is wiped out by unemployment and deprivations in their
homelands.
b.

U.S. employment restrictions violate the American Declaration

The plain language and expressio unius arguments set forth above
regarding the ICCPR are equally applicable to the American Declaration
and Convention. The language of the Inter-American instruments is
universal, and does not expressly provide for distinctions on the basis of
alienage or immigration status. Like the ICCPR, the American Convention
limits rights of freedom of movement and residence and procedural
protections in expulsion proceedings to aliens “lawfully in the territory of a
State Party” (Article 22), and permits limitations on rights of political
participation on the basis of citizenship, nationality, and residence (Article
23). The treaty, however, otherwise does not distinguish on these grounds.
Moreover, Article 29 of the Convention provides that no restrictions may be
imposed on Convention rights other than those provided for in the treaty,134
while Article 30 provides that even the restrictions authorized under the
Convention “may not be applied except in accordance with laws enacted for
reasons of general interest and in accordance with the purpose for which
such restrictions have been established.”135
The nondiscrimination jurisprudence of the Inter-American system
substantially comports with that under the ICCPR and supports the
conclusion that U.S. employment laws improperly discriminate against
immigrant workers. This Court’s 1984 Advisory Opinion on the Proposed
Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa
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Rica laid down the fundamental principle that state sovereignty over
immigration does not trump human rights:
[D]espite the fact that it is traditionally accepted that the conferral
and regulation of nationality are matters for each state to decide,
contemporary developments indicate that international law does
impose certain limits on the broad powers enjoyed by the states in
that area, and that the manners in which states regulate matters
bearing on nationality cannot today be deemed within their sole
jurisdiction; those powers of the state are also circumscribed by
their obligations to ensure the full protection of human rights.136
The Court went on to discuss Costa Rica’s proposed naturalization rule in
light of the American Convention’s nondiscrimination provisions. It stated
that:
[E]quality springs from the oneness of the human family and is
linked to the essential dignity of the individual…[i]t
is…irreconcilable with that notion to characterize a group as
inferior and treat it with hostility or otherwise subject it to
discrimination in the enjoyment of rights which are accorded to
others not so classified. It is impermissible to subject human
beings to differences in treatment that are inconsistent with their
unique and congenerous character.137
The Court continued to establish a reasonable proportionality test for
nondiscrimination under the Convention.
The Court held that
discrimination exists “when the classifications selected are based on
substantial factual differences and there exists a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between these differences and the aims of the legal rule
under review.”138 The Court then went on to examine the proposed
naturalization restrictions on the basis of whether the restrictions were
“inconsistent with the nature and purpose of the grant of nationality.”139
In a recent contentious case decision applying the standards laid down by
this Court, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that the
United States had violated the right to equality of a group of migrants being
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held in indefinite detention.140 In so doing, the Commission required that
distinctions be based on reasonable and objective criteria, and be reasonably
proportional to the objective being pursued. Thus, “[t]he right to equality
includes the prerequisite of an objective and reasonable justification as a
distinction basis.”141 The Commission found that “even though differences
in the treatment of nationals and foreigners are admitted with respect to the
entrance and permanence in the territory of any given country, the State has
to demonstrate that distinctions of this nature are reasonable and
proportionate with the objective they pursue.”142 In other words, even
sovereign state decisions regarding entrance and duration of stay must be
objective, reasonable, and proportional. As argued above, conditioning
workplace protections on citizenship or immigration status is not reasonably
related or proportional to an immigration-related objective.
Special note should also be made of the centrality of the rights at issue
for immigrant workers in the United States. Worker rights in the Americas
begin with the OAS Charter, which refers to the specific importance of
worker rights three times and makes numerous other provisions for
protecting work-related benefits. The Inter-American Charter of Social
Guarantees143 was adopted by the same conference that produced the OAS
Charter and the American Declaration. The Charter includes thirty-eight
substantive articles detailing labor rights written “in the belief…that it is to
the public interest…to give workers guarantees and rights on a scale not
lower than that fixed in the Conventions and Recommendations of the
[ILO].”144 As a detailed statement of rights contemporaneous with the
American Declaration, the Charter is an additional indicator of the centrality
of worker rights in the Americas.
c. Other international instruments also protect the fundamental right to
nondiscrimination in the workplace for immigrant workers.
Other international treaties and declarations applicable to the United
States also confirm that basic principles of nondiscrimination apply to
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workplace protections without distinction based on nationality or immigrant
status.
Like the ICCPR and the instruments of the Inter-American system,
Article 2(2) of the ICESCR forbids discrimination on the basis, inter alia,
of national or social origin, birth, or other status, and expressly establishes
rights that apply to all. Thus, Article 6 grants everyone the right to work;
Article 7 grants everyone just and favorable working conditions; Article 8
ensures everyone the right to establish trade unions; Article 9 guarantees the
right to social security for everyone, and Article 11 ensures the right of
everyone to an adequate standard of living including adequate food,
clothing, housing, and the continuous improvement of living conditions.
The only exception to the principle of nondiscrimination recognized by the
ICESCR is the Article 2(3) exception for developing countries, which is not
applicable to discriminatory laws adopted by the United States.145
The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
has addressed the situation of migrant workers in several contexts, making
clear its determination to extend the protections of the ICESCR to this
vulnerable group. In Concluding Observations reviewing state performance
under the ICESCR, the Committee has expressed concern over foreign
workers’ “appalling…working conditions,”146 discrimination against
immigrants and refugees in the workplace,147 and acts of discrimination and
racism against “illegal workers.”148 Also in its supervisory capacity, the
Committee has requested that States Party ensure that foreign workers enjoy
specific rights, including: the right to hold trade union office;149 to be
“adequately compensated” after working legally, contributing to the social
security system, and subsequently being expelled;150 and the right to the
same vocational guidance and training courses as those offered to
nationals.151 The Committee has pressed specific states to “effectively”
implement job security laws, “especially as regards the most vulnerable
groups, including foreigners”152 and to allow foreign domestic helpers to
“freely seek employment” upon expiration of their contracts.153 The
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Committee has also monitored states’ efforts to further the integration of
foreign workers.154
The ILO Committee of Experts similarly has concluded that the
fundamental principle of nondiscrimination in employment protected by
Convention No. 111 applies to both nationals and non-nationals, and does
not distinguish on the basis of an immigrant worker’s lawful or unlawful
status.155 In one case, for example, the Committee of Experts found that
poor working conditions, violence, and abuse against unlawful agricultural
migrant workers constituted “acts of discrimination on the basis of race,
colour, religion and national extraction.”156 As discussed further with
respect to freedom of association, below, the ILO reiterated this view in its
recent opinion on migrant workers.157
Finally in 1985, the U.N. General Assembly adopted, by consensus,
Resolution 40/144 containing the Declaration on the Human Rights of
Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live,
which covers all non-nationals, including migrant workers, refugees,
documented and undocumented aliens, and individuals who have lost their
nationality.158 The Declaration provides for respect for fundamental human
rights of all aliens, including equality before the courts and tribunals
(Article 5), trade union rights, the right to safe and healthy working
conditions and the right to medical care, social security, and education
(Article 8).159
Indeed, a comprehensive examination of the principle of equal protection
for non-citizens under international law has led the United Nations to
conclude as follows:
In general, international human rights law requires equal
treatment of citizens and non-citizens. The exceptions to that nondiscrimination principle are narrow and must be strictly construed.
In general, differential treatment of non-citizens may be acceptable
only if based on reasonable and objective criteria and designed to
achieve a legitimate purpose. With respect to civil and political
rights, in times of domestic stability States may distinguish among

VOLUME 1 • ISSUE 3 • 2003

839

840 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

citizens and non-citizens only as to political participation rights
and certain rights of entry and residence. Developing countries
may, to the extent necessary, differentiate among citizens and noncitizens in the area of economic rights. . . .
The extent of permissible differential treatment among noncitizens is somewhat broader. Instances of differentiation of this
type arise primarily in the regulation of entry, residence, and
naturalization of aliens—areas in which States have traditionally
exercised substantial discretion. Permissible distinctions among
non-citizens would appear to be limited to preferences extended to
the nationals of certain countries, such as other members of a
supranational political or economic entity, rather than the
imposition of more onerous conditions on citizens of selected
countries.160
B. U.S. Laws Discriminating Against Migrants Violate Freedom of
Association Under International Law
In addition to violating the principle of nondiscrimination under
international law, U.S. employment laws that fail to protect freedom of
association for unauthorized and other immigrant workers also violate the
fundamental international norm of freedom of association. As discussed
below, the ILO has explicitly recognized freedom of association as one of
four fundamental human rights that protect all workers, including
unauthorized and undocumented workers. Other international instruments
applicable to the United States likewise allow for exceptions to the principle
of freedom of association only in a narrow range of circumstances that do
not justify denying this right to aliens or unauthorized immigrants.
1. Freedom of association to protect labor union interests is a
fundamental human right.
Like nondiscrimination, the right to freedom of association, including the
right to organize a labor union, bargain collectively, and strike, is a
fundamental human right which is protected in a wide range of international
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human rights instruments, including many that are applicable to the United
States, as follows:
American Declaration
Article XXII. Right of association:
Every person has the right to associate with others to promote, exercise
and protect his legitimate interests of a political, economic, religious, social,
cultural, professional, labor union or other nature.
American Convention
Article 16. Freedom of Association:
1. Everyone has the right to associate freely for ideological, religious,
political, economic, labor, social, cultural, sports, or other purposes.
2. The exercise of this right shall be subject only to such restrictions
established by law as may be necessary in a democratic society, in the
interest of national security, public safety or public order, or to protect
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.
3. The provisions of this article do not bar the imposition of legal
restrictions, including even deprivation of the exercise of the right of
association, on members of the armed forces and the police.
OAS Charter
Article 45(c) & (g):
The Member States, convinced that man can only achieve the full
realization of his aspirations within a just social order, along with economic
development and true peace, agree to dedicate every effort to the application
of the following principles and mechanisms:…
c) Employers and workers, both rural and urban, have the right to
associate themselves freely for the defense and promotion of their interests,
including the right to collective bargaining and the workers’ right to strike,
and recognition of the juridical personality of associations and the
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protection of their freedom and independence, all in accordance with
applicable laws; . . .
g) Recognition of the importance of the contribution of organizations
such as labor unions, cooperatives, and cultural, professional, business,
neighborhood, and community associations to the life of the society and to
the development process;….
ICCPR
Article 22:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others,
including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of
his interests.
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than
those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security or public
safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or
morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This
article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on
members of the armed forces and of the police in the exercise of this
right.
ILO Convention (No. 87) on the Freedom of Association and Protection of
the Right to Organize161
Article 2:
Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the
right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation
concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing without previous
authorisation.
Article 9:
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The extent to which the guarantees provided for in this Convention shall
apply to the armed forces and the police shall be determined by national
laws or regulations.
Article 11:
Each Member of the International Labour Organisation for which this
Convention is in force undertakes to take all necessary and appropriate
measures to ensure that workers and employers may exercise freely the
right to organise.
ILO Convention (No. 98) regarding the Right to Organize and Collective
Bargaining162
Article 1:
1. Workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-union
discrimination in respect of their employment.
2. Such protection shall apply more particularly in respect of acts
calculated to:
(a) make the employment of a worker subject to the condition that he
shall not join a union or shall relinquish trade union membership;
(b) cause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a worker by reason of
union membership or because of participation in union activities
outside working hours or, with the consent of the employer, within
working hours.
Other international instruments applicable in some form to the United
States which recognize the right to freedom of association include the
ICESCR (Article 8), the Universal Declaration (Articles 20.1 and 23.4), and
the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation Between the
Government of the United States of America, the Government of Canada,
and the Government of the United Mexican States (NAALC) (Articles 2,
4).163 These specific treaty clauses regarding freedom of association are set
forth in Appendix C, Table 1, attached to this brief.
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As discussed below, none of these instruments authorizes denial of the
right to freedom of association based on alienage, unauthorized worker, or
other immigration status, as discussed below. Because the ILO is the
international body that has most specifically addressed this question,
jurisprudence under the ILO conventions will be considered first, followed
by the ICCPR and the American Convention.
2. The right to freedom of association protected by the ILO applies
equally to all workers, regardless of status.
The principle of freedom of association in the labor context is set forth in
greatest detail in ILO Conventions No. 87 and 98. The ILO has long
considered freedom of association to be a core human rights provision
relating to worker rights. The Preamble to the ILO Constitution recognizes
freedom of association as a means of establishing peace,164 while the
Declaration of Philadelphia reaffirms that freedom of expression and
association are essential to sustained progress.165 Indeed, the principle is so
important that for over fifty years, the ILO has maintained that the
obligation to protect the right to freedom of association is binding on all
ILO members as a matter of membership, regardless of whether states have
ratified the relevant ILO conventions.166 Furthermore, in its 1998
Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Principles of Work, the ILO
recognized freedom of association, like nondiscrimination, as one of the
four core labor rights that constitute fundamental human rights, and which
are binding on all ILO members, regardless of their ratification records.
Thus, like the ILO principle of nondiscrimination, the principle of freedom
of association is obligatory on the United States as a result of its ILO
membership, despite its failure to ratify the two relevant ILO
conventions.167 As the international body with the greatest expertise in the
labor rights area, the ILO’s interpretation of the principle of freedom of
association is also relevant to the construction of freedom of association
under other international instruments to which the United States is a party.
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The ILO Conventions regarding freedom of association do not allow for
any exception based on a worker’s immigration status or employment
authorization. Conventions No. 87 and 98 expressly recognize exceptions
only for members of the national police and armed forces, an exception that
is not implicated in this case.
Moreover, the ILO has interpreted the right to freedom of association as a
fundamental right that cannot be denied even to migrant workers who are
not lawfully present in a country. In the Spain case, for example, the ILO
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) concluded that a Spanish law
which provided that foreigners could exercise trade union rights only “when
they obtain authorization of their stay or residence in the country” violated
the fundamental right to freedom of association.168 The CFA confirmed that
Article 2 of Convention No. 87 “recognize[s] the rights of all workers,
without distinction whatsoever, to establish and join organizations of their
own choosing,” with the only permissible exception relating to the armed
forces and police.169
In an opinion issued in 2002, the ILO likewise interpreted the Migrant
Workers Convention (No. 143)170 and Recommendation (No. 151)171 as
providing that “illegally employed migrant workers are not deprived, by the
sole reference to their undocumented status, of their rights in respect of the
work actually performed.”172 In particular, the ILO reasoned that despite
the authority of states to treat documented and undocumented migrant
workers differently with respect to non-fundamental workplace rights, all
migrant workers are entitled to equal treatment with respect to “basic
human rights.”173 These rights include the fundamental human rights
contained in U.N. instruments, as well as the four core ILO worker rights
and their eight accompanying conventions.174 Although the Migrant
Convention itself has not been widely ratified by ILO members, the ILO
concluded that the decisions regarding application of the eight fundamental
ILO conventions (including freedom of association and nondiscrimination),
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“apply to all workers, whether nationals or non-nationals, without
distinction.”175
3. The Inter-American instruments and the ICCPR do not recognize
exceptions based on a worker’s unauthorized status.
a.

The American Declaration and Convention

The principle of freedom of association under the American Declaration
is potentially even broader than that recognized by the ILO, since Article
XXII of the Declaration applies to “every person” and includes no express
exceptions. On the other hand, the American Convention, the ICCPR, and
the ICESCR all recognize that states may make exceptions to this right
under certain circumstances. The American Convention applies to
“everyone”, but recognizes exceptions for the armed forces and police as
well as exceptions that are established by law and are “necessary in a
democratic society, in the interest of national security, public safety or
public order, or to protect public health or morals or the rights or freedoms
of others.”176 The ICCPR (Art. 22(2)) and ICESCR (Art. 8(1)(c) and (2))
contain similar language. And although these exceptions might be
construed as allowing broad suspensions of trade union rights, international
bodies have construed them very narrowly.
In the Baena Ricardo case, the Inter-American Court elaborated on the
requirement that an exception be “necessary in a democratic society.” The
Court interpreted the principle of freedom of association in the labor union
context as protecting “the basic right to constitute a group for the pursuit of
a lawful goal, without pressure or interference that may alter or denature its
objective.”177 The Court noted that “in trade union matters, freedom of
association is of the utmost importance for the defence of the legitimate
interests of the workers, and falls under the corpus juris of human rights.”178
The Court further concluded that the measures taken to deny the exercise
of trade union rights in that case could not be justified under the Article 16
exceptions. In particular, the Court found that there was no evidence that
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the measures “were necessary to safeguard the public order in the context of
the events, nor that they maintained a relationship to the principle of
proportionality; in sum . . . such measures did not meet the requirement of
being ‘necessary in a democratic society,’” as required by Article 16(2) of
the Convention.
b.

The ICCPR

The text of Article 16 of the American Convention was based on the
ICCPR,179 which also imposes rigorous requirements on the exceptions to
freedom of association. Freedom of association with respect to trade union
rights was expressly included in the ICCPR, despite its protection in the
ICESCR and ILO conventions, in order to underscore its importance as a
civil, as well as economic, right.180 Like other ICCPR provisions, Article
22 applies to “[e]veryone,” and thus applies equally to aliens and nationals
alike under the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment on the
Position of Aliens.181
None of the allowable restrictions on trade union activities under Article
22 of the ICCPR suggest that a state may deny the right to freedom of
association based on alienage or other immigration status. Like the
American Convention, restrictions on freedom of association under Article
22 must be “prescribed by law” (e.g., set down in sufficient definiteness by
legislative act or the common law), and must be “necessary to a democratic
society” for achieving one of the purposes set down in Article 22(2).
According to the CCPR Commentary, necessity under the ICCPR imposes a
strict requirement of proportionality; in other words, both the type and
intensity of a restriction must be absolutely necessary to attain a legitimate
purpose.182 The requirement that restrictions must comport with democratic
principles further requires that restrictions serve basic democratic values of
pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness.183
Finally, any restriction must be “in the interests of national security or
public safety, public order (ordre public) the protection of public health or
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morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others,” and must also
be proportional – or precisely balanced to the reason for the measure.184
More sweeping restrictions may be imposed only on members of the police
and armed forces.185
According to Human Rights Committee jurisprudence and the CCPR
Commentary, the exception for national security refers narrowly to grave
cases of political or military threat to the entire nation, where action is
necessary to secure the smooth functioning of the military and other
forces,186 while public safety contemplates a specific threat to the safety of
persons or things.187 Public order (or the French concept of “ordre public”),
refers to those “universally accepted fundamental principles, consistent with
respect for human rights, on which a democratic society is based.188 This
exception allows states to impose time, place, and manner restrictions on
trade union activities, including registration requirements and restrictions on
general strikes that cripple the economic or public life of the state.189
Finally, protection of the rights and freedoms of others refers to protection
of fundamental individual rights, as well as issues of personal safety and
physical integrity. It allows restrictions on freedom of association to protect
private property rights and to prohibit advocacy of national, racial, or
religious hatred.190
c. The denial of meaningful remedies to unauthorized workers cannot be
justified under the exceptions recognized by international law.
There can be little question that the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Hoffman that unauthorized workers may not recover back pay
when they are improperly fired for union-related activities substantially
eviscerates the right of freedom of association for unauthorized workers in
the United States. Because unauthorized workers are not entitled to
reinstatement when they are wrongfully terminated, back pay for lost wages
is the only effective remedy available for violations of the NLRA for this
group. Eliminating this remedy thus grants a carte blanche to employers to
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violate unauthorized migrant workers’ basic human rights with impunity,
and eliminates any meaningful recourse for such workers. The Hoffman
decision thus contravenes the United States’ obligation under international
law to provide “adequate protection” against anti-union discrimination,191
and de facto eliminates the right to organize and bargain collectively for
unauthorized migrant workers, regardless of whether they are lawfully
present in the United States.192
Nor can the restriction on remedies for violations of freedom of
association be justified under any exception in international law due to the
migrants’ status as unauthorized workers. The ILO conventions recognize
no such exception, and even under the exceptions allowed by the American
Convention, ICCPR, and ICESCR, the U.S. rules limiting the freedom of
association rights of unauthorized workers cannot be sustained. National
security, public safety, health or morals, or the rights of others are all
narrow exceptions which are not implicated by the Hoffman rule. Only the
public order exception could arguably be invoked to justify denial of
effective remedies to unauthorized workers in order to deter unauthorized
immigration. Even that exception, however, does not comfortably
accommodate an immigration justification. Moreover, an immigration
control justification clearly would not satisfy international law’s
requirements that the remedy be proportional and necessary to a democratic
society recognized both by this Court and the ICCPR. Denial of freedom of
association benefits to immigrant workers is contrary to the principles of
pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness.
As discussed with respect to nondiscrimination, above, denial of effective
remedies for trade union violations is in no sense necessary or proportional
to the goal of immigration control. There is no indication that respecting
the fundamental right to freedom of association for such workers will in any
way thwart the effectiveness of U.S. immigration policy. Indeed, far from
deterring unlawful immigration, denial of freedom of association rights to
immigrants has precisely the opposite effect, creating an incentive for
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unscrupulous employers to recruit unauthorized workers, whom the
employer knows effectively cannot organize or otherwise seek the
protection of U.S. laws. The denial of the back pay remedy simply harms
unauthorized workers, other workers who seek to assert their collective
bargaining rights in the workplace, and scrupulous employers who are
disadvantaged by the economic advantage gained by employers who are
willing to exploit the reduced rights of unauthorized immigrants.

CONCLUSION
As noted in the introduction to this brief, the United States is the largest
employer of migrant workers in the world. U.S. laws that discriminate
against migrant workers in employment affect a tremendous number of
OAS nationals, and subject them to significant forms of mistreatment and
discrimination. Non-nationals in certain immigration categories and certain
geographical locations are expressly excluded from the protections of vital
labor and employment laws, including workers’ compensation protections,
the right of legal assistance to redress employment law violations, the
protections of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act
and the Unfair Immigration-Related Employment Practices Act. Moreover,
unauthorized immigrant workers’ rights to certain remedies for violation of
their fundamental right to organize and to be free from discrimination are
hampered by the Hoffman decision. Unscrupulous employers use these
pronouncements by courts to take unfair advantage of immigrant workers.
U.S. laws and court decisions depriving migrant workers of labor rights
and other employee protections violate international nondiscrimination and
freedom of association norms. International human rights law does not
generally allow distinctions on the basis of alienage, or distinctions based
on immigration status where fundamental rights such as nondiscrimination
and freedom of association are implicated. Nor can these laws be justified
by the government’s border-control prerogative, because migration control
is demonstrably not served by limiting worker protections for immigrants,
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and because the general protective purpose of employment laws is not
served by distinctions drawn on the basis of nationality or immigrant
classification.
The effect of exclusionary laws and court decisions is to both undermine
workers’ rights and enforcement of immigration law. Employers are
encouraged to take unfair advantage of unauthorized workers, all to the
detriment of the workers themselves and to the employers who abide by
U.S. employment laws. The sheer number of OAS natio193nals who are
implicated, the vulnerability of these workers, and the paucity of decisions
regarding the employment rights of non-nationals in the OAS or elsewhere
in the international system underscores the need for this Court to lend
clarity to the provisions of the Inter-American system and to establish
fundamental worker protections for all workers in the region.
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general comments as it may consider appropriate.” ICCPR, art. 40(4). The Committee’s
general comments are addressed to all States parties and are intended, among other
things, “to draw the attention of the States parties to matters relating to the improvement
of . . . the implementation of the Covenant” and to “stimulate activities of States parties . .
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